

# Renewable resource exploitation: fishery regulation

NRE - Lecture 5

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- ▶ Market failure - absence of a resource price
- ▶ *Economic* overfishing implies excessive effort (inputs) and *rent dissipation*
- ▶ Rationale for regulation or *management*



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- ▶ Politically unpopular!

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
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
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- ▶ ITQ systems in Australia, New Zealand, Iceland and Canada

# ITQs: firm demand



# ITQs: industry *inverse* demand



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- ▶ Fiscal measures for rent capture?

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- ▶ e.g., Falkland Islands

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  - ▶ gear modifications, etc. (seabirds, cetaceans)

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- ▶ Cost recovery?



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- ▶ UK fisheries management  
<http://www.defra.gov.uk/marine/index.htm>  
<http://www.scotland.gov.uk/Topics/Fisheries/Sea-Fisheries>

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<http://www.scotland.gov.uk/Topics/Fisheries/Sea-Fisheries>
- ▶ New Zealand's ITQ system  
<http://www.fish.govt.nz/en-nz/Commercial/default.htm>